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Abstract 
A theoretical model is presented that identifies environmental and organiza­
tional characteristics that affect human resource (HR) performance in an organi­
zation. Specifically, we address the issue of when and under what circumstances 
does HR outsourcing contribute value to the firm by attempting to identifY environ­
mental and organizational characteristics that affect HR department performance 
and how HR outsourcing mediates that relationship. We propose that supplier 
competition in the HR provider market has a direct effect on the amount of HR 
outsourcing which in turn has a direct effect on HR performance. Environmental 
uncertainty (primary, competitive, and supplier) is proposed to moderate there­
lationship between amount of HR outsourcing and HR performance while asset 
specificity is proposed to moderate the relationship between supplier competition 
and amount of HR outsourcing. An earlier version of this paper was presented at 
the Southwest Academy of Management meeting in Houston, Texas, March, 2003, 
and received the 2003 Irwin/McGraw-Hill Distinguished Paper Award. 
Introduction 
Human resource outsourcing has become a major part of human resource (HR) 
operations for the last few years. A 2004 joint study conducted by the Society 
for Human Resource Management (SHRM) and the Bureau of National Affairs 
(BNA) found that two-thirds of HR executives surveyed say their HR depart­
ments outsource at least one HR activity (Bureau of National Affairs, 2004), 
with this activity expected to increase. Proctor & Gamble (P&G), for instance, 
signed an agreement with IBM that took effect in January 2004 and led to the 
outsourcing of P&G's worldwide HR services, valued at $400 million to IBM. 
Despite the increased activity, however, there is recognition that careful planning 
should be employed before making the decision to outsource. In fact, a separate 
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2004 SHRM human resource outsourcing survey found that in some cases HR 
outsourcing led to a decrease in customer service (25% of respondents), a less 
personal relationship with employees (37% of respondents), and a decrease in 
employee morale (6% of respondents). The information contained in these two re­
cent surveys seems to indicate that a good understanding of the factors that drive 
HR outsourcing and a good understanding of the expected outcomes is necessary 
to ensure that organizations fulfill their HR functions in a manner that allows them 
to remain competitive in their respective industries. 
Literature Review 
In many studies that discuss outsourcing, cost benefits appear to be a com­
elling argument for contracting out services previously performed internally 
e.g., Anderson & Weitz, 1986; Belous, 1989; Greer, Youngblood, & Gray, 1999; 
upta & Gupta, 1992; Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2002; Lever, 1997), and Vin­
ing & G loberman ( 1999) note that empirical data from government agencies 
outsourcing to private suppliers generated savings in the range of 20-30% in 
roduction costs. However, some of these same studies caution that cost should 
ot be the only factor considered in the decision to outsource. Other factors to 
onsider include vendor expertise, customer and employee satisfaction (Barthe­
lemy, 2003; Greer, Youngblood & Gray, 1999; Gupta & Gupta, 1992), and loss 
f strategic advantage (Anderson & Weitz, 1986; Greer, Youngblood & Gray, 
1999, Gupta & Gupta, 1992; Lever, 1997). In a more recent study, Adler (2003) 
otes that a review by the Gartner group listed six factors that are important in 
utsourcing decisions: dependency risk, spillover risk, trust, relative proficiency, 
trategic capabilities, and flexibility. The first four of these are classified as short­
erm factors, whereas the last two can be considered more long-term or strate­
ic. However, no clear formula exists that identifies when outsourcing is most 
fficient and effective. There are also very few empirical studies that examine 
he performance implications of make or buy decisions (e.g. Leiblein, Reuer, & 
Dalsace, 2002). Rather, studies seem to concentrate on the reasons organizations 
utsource, how to outsource, or the impact of outsourcing on the organization 
nd its employees. 
Notably absent from the literature is the question of when outsourcing is most 
appropriate or under what circumstances an organization should outsource to 
increase human resources (HR) performance. In other words, are there internal 
nd external forces that are conducive to HR outsourcing? If these forces can 
e identified, they may provide some clues concerning the appropriate action to 
ake when outsourcing is being considered. This is especially important since 
67% of HR departments outsourced one or more functions in 2004 (Bureau of 
ational Affairs, 2004 ). We specifically address the issue of when and under what 
ircumstances does HR outsourcing contribute value to the firm by attempting 
o idcnti ty environmental and organizational characteristics that affect H R per­
formance and how HR outsourcing mediates that relationship. 
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A separate issue concerning the current outsourcing research is the absence of 
studies looking at the HR function in organizations. Although there are numerous 
theoretical and empirical articles on outsourcing organizational functions such 
as information systems and accounting, the academic literature on outsourcing 
the HR function is almost non-existent. Although Klaas (2003) developed a 
framework that helps analyze HR outsourcing factors in small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) by explicating on the relationship between SMEs and the 
professional employer organizations and Gainey and Klaas (2003) analyze HR 
outsourcing specifically in the context oftraining and development, these studies 
are the exception rather than the rule. This fact is surprising given that many HR 
functions such as payroll, benefits, training, and recruiting are often outsourced 
by organizations (Gilley, Greer & Rasheed, 2004; Lever, 1997). 
The SHRM Human Resource Outsourcing Survey Report, released in June 2004, 
found that HR functions that are entirely outsourced are generally background 
checking, employee assistance/counseling, and Flexible Spending Account (FSA) 
administration. The functions that are partially outsourced include administration 
of health care benefits, pension benefits administration, and payroll. Despite this 
increase in HR outsourcing activity, to date, the empirical articles on outsourcing 
HR functions focus on the impact of organizational characteristics (Klaas, Mc­
Clendon & Gainey, 2001), the role of transaction costs (Gainey & Klaas, 2003; 
Klaas, 2003; Klaas, McClendon & Gainey, 1999), the relationship between HR 
department size and outsourcing activity (Pommerenke & Stout, 1996), and the 
rationale and consequences ofHR outsourcing (Greer, Youngblood & Gray, 1999; 
Lever, I 997). The question concerning when to outsource HR practices based on 
the internal and external forces driving the firm to consider outsourcing, however, 
is not directly addressed, although Klaas, McClendon & Gainey (1999) come 
close in their analysis of moderator variables in the relationship between amount 
of HR outsourcing and perceived benefits from outsourcing. A separate article 
by Klaas, McClendon and Gainey (2001) also touches on certain organizational 
characteristics that lead firms to outsource HR activities, but does not consider 
HR performance as a dependent variable. As such, it is necessary to address the 
question of when to outsource the HR function by looking into the theoretical 
issues of outsourcing in the literature representing disciplines other than HR to 
form a basis for I-IR outsourcing. However, a brief discussion of definitions and 
HR activities is presented first. 
In this paper, the term outsourcing will refer to the action of allowing external 
vendors to perform an entire HR activity (such as training, payroll, etc.) for an 
organization. The term insourcing will refer to the action of the organization 
performing the entire HR activity in-house, and the term co-sourcing will refer 
to the action of allowing an organization's HR generalist to work with external 
vendors on some activities, or to the action of allowing HR specialists to work 
as consultants to line managers who actually perform HR duties. 
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The HR Value Chain 
The HR func tions performed in an organization can be thought of as a chain 
of events or tasks that start w ith the planning of the organization's staffing needs 
and end with an employee 's exi t from the organization. Figure I illustrates the 
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chain of events as they occur in an organization. These events form the basis of 
the HR function and serve as a guide for determining which specific HR func­
tions may be eligible for outsourcing. It is important to distinguish between those 
functions that are a core element of the organization/employee relationship (those 
that create value for the organization) and those that are not. Two typologies are 
used to illustrate this point. 
Gilley, Greer, and Rasheed (2004) discuss a strategic typology ofHR activities 
developed by Alan Speaker (Greer, 2001) in which HR activities are classified 
as having either high or low strategic value and as being either transactional 
or relationship-oriented in nature. Their resulting typology shows the quadrant 
containing relationship-oriented activities with high strategic value to the firm 
to include several HR activities related to training and performance evaluation. 
In addition, the quadrant containing transactional activities with high strategic 
value includes activities related to staffing, benefits planning, and compliance. 
Their article suggests that high strategic value activities and relationship-oriented 
activities might not be good candidates for outsourcing activity. Rather, they 
suggest that low strategic value activities that are transactional in nature such as 
payroll, benefits administration, employee records, and relocation administration 
are the best candidates for outsourcing. 
A separate, but similar, typology is Lepak and Snell's (1998) model of virtual 
HR in which HR activities are classified as either high or low in uniqueness and 
high or low in value. A high value activity is one that is directly instrumental 
for achieving organizational objectives, while a low value activity is one that 
is primarily administrative or transactional in nature. An activity that is low in 
uniqueness is one that is routine, while an activity high in uniqueness is considered 
idiosyncratic. Lepak and Snell ( 1998) argue that the quadrant representing high 
value and high uniqueness contains core HR activities that are most likely to be 
carried out internally to obtain a competitive advantage. Thus, these activities 
should not typically be outsourced, but other routine administrative activities 
located in other quadrants might be outsourced to the growing supply of external 
vendors specializing in these activities. 
When the HR activities listed by Gilley, eta!. (2004) are located in the HR value 
chain, it becomes obvious that portions of each major HR function are potential 
candidates for outsourcing. However, three functions in particular, training, per­
formance planning and evaluation, and compensation, deal specifically with an 
organization's current relationship with its employees. As soon as the employee 
is hired, he or she receives some type of training, is informed of job performance 
evaluation processes, and is informed of compensation issues related to pay and 
benefits. If an employee stays with the organization, the cycle of training, per­
formance, and compensation repeats itself many times throughout the course of 
the employee's tenure with the organization. The professionalism and fairness 
with which an organization performs these activities is directly related to how 
employees feel about the organization. Thus, these three functions comprise an 
organizational career management system and are crucial in developing corporate 
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strategies concerning employee retention, employee value to the organization, and 
employee productivity. As such, outsourcing in these three major HR functions 
should be considered carefully before any final decisions are made. 
The Proposed Model 
Because HR outsourcing has received such scant attention in the literature, it 
is necessary to address the question of when and under what circumstances HR 
outsourcing contributes to firm performance by looking at the literature repre­
senting disciplines other than HR. In particular, theory from economics, orga­
ni zations, and strategy will be used to develop the proposed framework. Figure 
2 depicts the proposed model of the relationship between competition, amount 
of HR outsourcing and HR performance. Moderator variables, asset specificity 
and three types of environmental uncertainty, are also used to help determine the 
conditions under which HR outsourcing may affect HR performance. 
Figure 2 
Model of HR Outsourcing 
P3 
+ 
P1 
P6 
Supplier Competition and Outsourcing 
When people and organizations agree to conduct business together, a process 
emerges that helps determine demand, supply, and prices for particular goods and 
services. As the number of people and organizations involved in business transac­
tions increases, the potential for competition between these groups also increases. 
For instance, when the number of sellers in a particular market increase, buyers 
have more freedom to pick and choose the organizations with whom they want 
to conduct business than they do ifthere are few sellers. Because large numbers 
of sellers are trying to capture the same market share, the sellers will compete 
with one another in an attempt to obtain as much market share as possible. The 
resulting competition may cause the sellers to differentiate their services in terms 
of price, quality, or customer service. 
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When competition is limited, a decreased quantity of goods and services is 
available, and the prices of those goods and services tend to increase. For ex­
ample, Lynk (1995) found that mergers between hospitals led to significantly 
higher prices in health care service, indicating an exploitation of market power 
created by a reduction of competition. In contrast, as competition increases (with 
more firms entering the market) the quantity of goods and services available to 
potential buyers should also increase. Because neoclassical economic theory as­
sumes the buyer to be rational and informed, buyers should choose the product 
that best meets their needs and price concerns, thereby choosing the alternative 
that is most efficient. Therefore, as competition between external HR provider 
firms increases, the quantity of goods and services available to corporate buyers 
should also increase with buyers choosing the most efficient alternative. 
In the five forces model of competition (Porter, 1980), five competitive forces 
determine the state of competition in an industry. Three of these forces, potential 
new entrants into a market, substitute products, and rivalry among competing 
sellers in a market, often lead to new technology, improved products, and lower 
prices. Thus, a firm wishing to outsource HR functions in a strong competitive 
vendor environment is likely to benefit from a strong bargaining position. 
An organization performing a particular HR activity in-house may not be able 
to compete effectively with firms offering the same service externally, particu­
larly if an external provider has a competitive advantage unavailable to others. 
In this situation, marginal analysis would help determine if the HR activity is 
costing more than the worth of the HR activity's contribution to total organization 
output. Marginal analysis looks at the changes in costs and benefits that occur 
when changes from the status quo are proposed. These marginal changes in the 
costs and benefits are the basis for rational economic choice (Eke lund & Tollison, 
1991 ). In a competitive situation concerning employee wages, for example, mar­
ginal analysis would determine if an employee is worth keeping. If the employee 
being analyzed is paid more than the worth of his or her contribution to total 
output, it is economically unsound to keep the employee on the payroll. In the 
same vein, if an insourced human resource activity costs more to operate than it 
is contributing to total output of the organization, it is economically unsound to 
continue operating the HR activity internally. 
Transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937) helps explain this idea further. Trans­
action cost refers to the cost of organizing information, protecting the interests 
of all parties in the transaction, monitoring the transactions, and other similar 
costs involved in a transaction (Aubert, Rivard & Patry, 1996). In a discussion 
oftransaction costs, Coase ( 193 7) noted that "a firm will tend to expand until the 
costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs 
of carrying out the same transaction by means of exchange on the open market or 
the costs of organizing in another firm," (Coase, 1937, p. 341 ). In other words, 
when internal transaction costs equal the cost of purchasing the same good or 
service on the open market, the organization will tend to stop producing internally 
and purchase from the open market. 
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Williamson (1975) suggests that a buyer who is dependent upon one supplier 
for goods will be less able to resist or avoid opportunism by the supplier than 
a buyer who has several suppliers from whom to purchase goods. The lack of 
alternative suppliers may create a small numbers bargaining problem for the 
buyer, thus creating an incentive for the buyer to vertically integrate (Levy, 1985). 
From an outsourcing perspective, when competition for suppliers of a particular 
good or service increases, the number of choices increase, and the ability of a 
supplier to engage in opportunistic behavior decreases. The increased level of 
competition creates an environment that is more favorable to the buyer in terms 
of choice and the ability to use alternate suppliers if necessary. Without several 
alternatives, it is doubtful that outsourcing would occur at all since firms would 
be hesitant to place themselves in a situation that forces them to be dependent 
upon a single supplier. 
This concept of transaction cost falls in line with theories of competition, cost 
leadership and differentiation strategy (Porter 1980). An organization cannot 
afford to compete effectively when it pays more for services or goods than its 
competitors unless it differentiates itself clearly from other market providers. If 
business competitors use a less expensive but equal method to operate their HR 
activities, the organization that continues to pay more for the same service may 
be at a competitive disadvantage by not utilizing a cost strategy. Additionally, as 
external HR provider firms increase in number, competition among these contract 
providers will likely lead to new technology, improved products, and economies 
of scale not available to organizations not specializing in the HR activity. External 
HR provider firms that exploit either cost advantages or special differentiated ser­
vices through improved technology and products may entice many organizations 
to outsource. Indeed, in a study of semiconductor firms, Leiblen, et a!. (2002) 
found that number of suppliers correlated with greater outsourcing activity. 
In summary, increased HR vendor competition may create positive benefits for 
organizations purchasing their services. From a neoclassical economic perspec­
tive, increased levels of external supplier competition should lower the costs of 
externally produced goods causing the rational consumer to purchase the goods 
externally rather than producing them internally at a higher cost. Therefore: 
Proposition 1: There is a positive relationship between supplier 
competition in the external HR provider market and amount 
of HR outsourcing. 
The Relationship Between Outsourcing and HR Performance 
Because firms outsource to increase performance, HR outsourcing should lead 
to increased HR performance such that HR outsourcing acts as a mediator between 
supplier competition and HR performance. The decision to make or buy is based 
on a number of elements in the internal and external environment (White, 2000), 
and the idea of competing based on the amount of hard assets owned has shifted 
to competing on the basis of intangible assets and capabilities (Gottfredson, 
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Puryear & Phillips, 2005). As a result, the amount of outsourcing in areas such 
as production and information processing has increased tremendously in the last 
several years in an attempt to compete by using the most attractive opportunities 
inside and outside the organization. Outsourcing is attractive to upper management 
because it improves some of the metrics used to judge company performance. For 
instance, "shedding specific assets allows a company to increase return on assets 
(ROA) and return on investment (ROI), and decreasing the head count increases 
revenue per employee," (Rossetti & Choi, 2005, pp. 48-49). Another benefit of 
outsourcing includes reducing prices of goods provided, which in turn leads to 
higher price to earning ratios. In summary, firms that outsource any function do 
so with the idea that the firm's performance will increase. Several sources indicate 
that this is indeed the case (Ellram & Carr, 1994; Smeltzer, Manship & Rossetti, 
2003; Velocci, 2001 ), and thus we expect that an increase in HR outsourcing will 
result in an increase in HR performance. 
Proposition 2: There is a significant mediating effect of amount 
of HR outsourcing on the relationship between supplier com­
petition and HR performance. 
Asset Specificity 
Williamson's (1985, 1986) work on transaction costs expands Coase's (1937) 
original theory by defining key aspects of a transaction cost framework. One key 
aspect is that of asset specificity, or the investment in assets that are specific to 
the requirements of a particular exchange relationship. Research has shown that 
asset specificity reduces the degree of outsourcing (Jensen & Rothwell, 1998; 
Monteverde & Teece, 1982). For example, in an HR context, asset specificity is 
high in a transaction where software is designed to perform a specific HR task 
for a specific organization. Transaction costs are likely to be high in this instance 
since the software cannot be used in other organizations. Both purchaser and 
vendor will desire protections from each other if something goes wrong, thus 
increasing costs of the transaction. If asset specificity is low, however, market 
transaction costs are likely to be lower and many suppliers should then effectively 
compete (Vining & Globerman, 1999). In this scenario, as the number of exter­
nal I-IR provider firms offering basic, non-specific service that all organizations 
need (e.g. payroll administration) increases, external vendor competition should 
increase and cause internally produced services to be more costly to administer. 
The key is to determine which activities in the HR value chain have low asset 
specificity and can be outsourced without damaging the organization/employee 
relationship. 
The specific HR tasks or services being outsourced can have an impact on 
the relationship proposed in proposition one, particularly if an HR service that 
creates a competitive advantage for the firm is outsourced. The concept of asset 
specificity is very similar to Klaas, McClendon and Gainey's (2001) concept of 
idiosyncratic practices developed by firms to create a strategic HR advantage. 
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These idiosyncratic practices are often firm-specific, based on tacit firm knowl­
edge, and can limit the ability of an external HR provider firm to provide the 
same level of service as an internal HR department. As such, asset specificity 
should be accounted for in the competition/amount of HR outsourcing relation­
ship. Since prior research has shown that asset specificity reduces the amount of 
outsourcing (Jensen & Rothwell, 1998; Monteverde & Teece, 1982), we propose 
that asset specificity moderates the relationship between supplier competition 
and amount of HR outsourcing. 
Proposition 3: There is a negative moderating effect of HR task 
asset specificity on the relationship between supplier competi­
tion and amount of HR outsourcing. 
Environmental Uncertainty and Outsourcing 
Seminal works in the area of environmental uncertainty suggest that the most 
effective firms tend to use mechanistic or bureaucratic designs in stable, predict­
able environments while organic designs are used by effective firms in unstable, 
turbulent environments (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; 
Thompson, 1967). In other words, the type of organizational design used should 
match the organization's environment. Although much has been written about the 
relationship between environmental uncertainty and organizational design, some 
scholars have looked specifically at the role information processing plays in this 
relationship (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Galbraith, 1974; Huber, 1991 ). Arguments 
have been made suggesting that the level of analysis for information process­
ing should be the subunit or departmental level rather than the organizational 
level because organizations are composed of subunits which are interdependent 
(e.g. Tushman & Nadler, 1978).lnformation processing is important because an 
organization's ability to process information is tied to environmental uncertainty. 
The more uncertain the environment, the more difficult information processing 
becomes, and the more likely it is that an organization developing better methods 
for processing information will obtain a competitive advantage. 
Considering the HR department as a subunit in an organization, it is appro­
priate to analyze the structure and process of the HR function in the theoretical 
vein suggested by the studies mentioned previously. Seminal research clearly 
suggests that in stable, predictable environments, a bureaucratic structure is the 
most effective design to use. Therefore, when labor demand and supply are stable 
and predictable, outsourcing the HR function, even a bureaucratic one, seems 
unnecessary since all market competitors have fairly complete information in an 
unchanging market. It would be difficult to obtain a competitive advantage for HR 
under these conditions since the resource in question (labor market information) 
is not limited to one organization. Indeed, such information is often compiled by 
government agencies and dispensed publicly to all interested parties. 
A more recent view of environmental uncertainty suggests that uncertainty 
is divided into three distinct components - primary, competitive, and supplier 
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(Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998). The first component, primary uncertainty, refers to "un­
certainty arising from exogenous sources, such as natural events, from changes in 
preferences, as well as from regulatory changes, such as those involving standards 
or tariffs," (Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998, p. 3). Competitive uncertainty is defined as 
"the uncertainty arising from the actions of potential or actual competitors ... ," 
(Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998, p 4). These two forms of uncertainty are somewhat 
similar in an HR outsourcing context in that a firm must deal with the effects of 
these types of uncertainty after they occur. For instance, changes in Department of 
Labor regulations concerning the status of exempt versus nonexempt employees 
and the calculation of overtime have caused many HR departments to recreate the 
entire timekeeping process to avoid potential legal problems. When competitors 
raise or lower the average wage level for a particular area, HR departments must 
decide if they should or should not match the competitor's wage and the impact 
that will have on their workforce. Because primary and competitive uncertainty 
create a situation in which the firm must react after the event has occurred, it is 
expected that high levels of primary and competitive uncertainty will enhance 
the ability of firms specializing in HR outsourcing to outperform internal HR 
departments. The reasoning for this assumption is based on the idea that firms 
specializing in HR services will have more ability to focus on specific HR issues 
and will be able to respond more quickly when changes occur. 
Proposition 4: There is a positive moderating effect of primary 
uncertainty on the relationship between amount ofHR outsourc­
ing and HR performance. 
Proposition 5: There is a positive moderating effect of com­
petitive uncertainty on the relationship between amount ofHR 
outsourcing and HR performance. 
The third type of uncertainty proposed by Sutcliff and Zaheer ( 1998) is sup­
plier uncertainty, defined as the behavioral uncertainty of an exchange partner 
firm. Supplier uncertainty is related to possible opportunism by the supplier, and 
is expected to have a negative moderating effect on the relationship between HR 
outsourcing and HR performance. In an HR outsourcing context, an increase in 
supplier uncertainty would suggest that the external HR provider firms are in a 
position to act in self-serving ways at the expense of the contracting organiza­
tion. Thus, an increase in the ability of external HR provider firms to engage in 
opportunism could lead to a decrease in HR performance. 
Proposition 6: There is a negative moderating effect of sup­
plier uncertainty on the relationship between amount of HR 
outsourcing and HR performance. 
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Model Limitations 
The propositions presented are intended to give some solid theoretical back­
ground for determining when the HR function should or should not be outsourced. 
It is well and good to discuss competitive advantages and employee reactions 
concerning outsourcing, but defining the appropriate situation in which to act to 
increase HR performance has not yet been established. The proposed model is a 
starting point for connecting outsourcing activities to HR performance. 
A potential difficulty with the model, however, is adequately defining and mea­
suring what is meant by HR performance. In firm-level studies of outsourcing, 
profitability and earnings per share may be appropriate measures of performance, 
but performance in the HR function is more difficult to quantify in dollar amounts, 
although some authors have made progress in this regard (Becker, Huselid & 
Ulrich, 200 I). Basic operating cost comparisons can be made easily, but intangible 
functions such as creating the appropriate organizational culture or ensuring that 
employees feel valued and supported by the organization are difficult to measure 
and difficult to translate into dollar amounts. These intangible factors, however, 
need to be quantified in order to obtain a valid measure ofHR performance. If the 
goal of outsourcing is to improve the function being outsourced, valid measures 
must be available to determine whether the outsourcing is successfuL Perhaps 
each component in the HR value chain can be analyzed to determine specific 
measures for each function that can then be compiled into an overall measure of 
HR performance. The measures might include both operating costs and behavioral 
components translated into dollar amounts. 
In addition, since the dependent variable is HR performance, the knowledge, 
skills, and abilities (KSAs) of individuals performing the work are most likely 
part of the HR performance measure. The model, however, does not account for 
individual contributions to HR performance. Just as HR performance is difficult 
to measure, individual KSA contributions to an organization are also difficult 
to measure. For instance, the labor relations manager who convinces the local 
union to avert a strike certainly has KSAs that contribute value to the firm, but 
how should the manager's KSAs be measured? Perhaps colleagues, subordinates, 
and supervisors could give a reasonable measure of the manager's KSAs as some 
360-degree performance evaluations require, but obtaining 360-degree feedback 
for all HR department employees can be impractical, and performance ratings 
are often inflated and inaccurate. Thus, although HR performance is likely to be 
a function of employees' skills and abilities, employee KSAs are not included 
in the model. 
Another limitation concerns other functions and departments within the orga­
nization. Because HR performance often depends upon the willingness of other 
departments to follow organizational policy and procedure, individuals outside of 
the HR function may have an impact on HR performance. For example, assume 
the HR department adequately conducts sexual harassment workshops and has 
tried without success to discipline a vice-president who informs his managers to 
ignore all complaints from female employees. The vice-president is a personal 
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friend of the CEO, and simply refuses to take sexual harassment seriously. 
Lawsuits resulting from sexual harassment complaints may count against HR 
performance even though HR employees have done everything possible to stop 
sexual harassment. 
The factors discussed above and others are likely to contribute to HR perfor­
mance that are not considered in the proposed model, and any test of the model 
will most likely yield a small r-square value because of the missing variables. 
Despite this limitation, the model is adequate as a starting point for determining 
how outsourcing affects the relationship between external forces of competition 
and HR performance. If the model is significant, it would indicate that the amount 
ofHR outsourcing does have an impact on HR performance under certain condi­
tions. Since the goal of outsourcing any task is to reduce costs, gain expertise and 
control over processes, and improve quality of service (Shelgren, 2004 ), knowing 
that HR outsourcing may add value to the firm is a positive step in determining 
ways to capitalize on any potential benefits of outsourcing. 
Conclusion 
A number of organizations have begun to outsource the HR function, and it 
would be helpful to understand the impact of outsourcing on firm performance. 
Electronic Data Systems will combine forces with Towers Perrin to create an HR 
outsourcing company that is expected to bring in $600 million in annual revenues 
(Fuquay, 2005), and consulting firm NelsonHall says the worldwide market for 
HR outsourcing services is expected to grow 21% annually to $7 billion by 2008 
(McDougall, 2005). The sheer size ofthe market for HR outsourcing suggests that 
firms should be aware of the forces that indicate outsourcing to be beneficial or 
detrimental to the organization. The research to date on HR outsourcing has not 
yet determined the circumstances under which HR outsourcing would be most 
beneficial, and part of the problem lies with the inability of researchers and firms 
to grasp an overall, widely accepted measure of HR performance. 
Many HR functions may not lend themselves to outsourcing, and changing the 
dependent variable from HR performance to HR function performance for specific 
functions such as payroll or employee development may help determine which 
functions should or should not be outsourced. The HR value chain illustrates 
in a timeline fashion how certain HR activities become tied to an employee's 
value to the organization. Training leads to better performance which leads to 
higher compensation, and the cycle of training, performance and compensation 
repeats itself throughout the life of the employee in the organization. Because 
an organization has invested time and money in training employees, the deci­
sion to outsource should not be made lightly. If conditions in the environment 
and in the organization are conducive to outsourcing, the amount of time and 
money invested in the HR professional employees who are to be downsized 
should be considered for the sake of the organization as well as for the sake of 
the employee. 
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Unlike an outsourced manufacturing process, where the cost of goods and qual­
ity metrics can clearly show if the outsourced process is successful in meeting 
numeric goals of production, HR practices are typically intertwined together to 
form a coherent overall strategy that is more difficult to tease apart and measure 
individually. The literature on HR bundles illustrates this point (see Macduffie, 
1995, for a specific manufacturing example). For instance, an overall strategy that 
claims, "People are our most important asset," would suggest that all HR practices 
from recruiting to retirement focus on the individual employee to make them feel 
like a valued part of the organization. If a specific HR function such as benefits 
administration is outsourced to an external provider, however, the employee 
may feel more like a number than like a valued employee. At this point, there is 
a potential breakdown in the overall strategy, and metrics showing the amount 
of money saved by outsourcing benefits administration may look promising, but 
employees themselves may feel less committed to the organization. As a result, 
other HR performance measures that are typically not calculated in benefits ad­
ministration, such as turnover or absenteeism, may increase. HR management 
is concerned with the management of people in an organization throughout all 
phases of the employment process, and improving one part at the expense of 
another part makes little sense. Thus, the emphasis earlier in this paper on core 
HR activities with high strategic value is not misplaced, and the authors who 
caution that cost should not be the only factor in the decision to outsource have 
good reason for their arguments (Anderson & Weitz, 1986; Greer, Youngblood 
& Gray, 1999; Lever, 1997). 
The field of HR management has transformed over the past few decades from 
being primarily a record-keeping function to a strategic function that helps develop 
strategies for fitting HR practices with the overall organization's strategy. The old 
record-keeping functions tend to be routine, bureaucratic, and have low strategic 
value; thus, they can probably be outsourced with little effect on the individual 
employees of the organization. However, some people do not see the value of 
"new" and strategic HR departments because they see all of the HR function as 
a bureaucratic, record-keeping function that adds nothing to the firm's bottom 
line. Thomas Stewart (1996), for example, suggests that most HR departments 
are 80 percent routine administration with no value-added, so the entire HR 
department should be abolished; not improved, but completely eliminated. The 
problem with Stewart's suggestion is that many researchers have decided that the 
acquisition and management of human capital can become a strong competitive 
advantage for an organization if handled appropriately (Barney, 1995; Barney & 
Wright, 1998; Brockbank, 1999). Since most managers are kept busy with typical 
tasks such as production or sales, few have extra time to devote to the human 
resource component of the business. This situation means that someone needs to 
develop the HR practices that are critical to creating and sustaining a competitive 
advantage with human capital. It also means that decisions to outsource the HR 
function must be made with the appropriate information, and the research in this 
area needs more development and clarity. 
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Future research should focus on other organizational characteristics or envi­
ronmental characteristics that affect HR performance based on the amount of 
outsourcing. Other organizational characteristics might include organization 
structure and design, particularly in the HR department itself, or the size of the 
organization. Other environmental characteristics might include boundary span­
ning capabilities ofthe organization or the level of resource dependence the firm 
experiences. Learning more about the conditions under which HR outsourcing 
affects specific HR functions would help HR departments plan accordingly when 
making decisions to outsource. Although the purpose of this paper is to identify 
characteristics of the organization or environment that determine when to out­
source HR and subsequent performance, another valuable component of deter­
mining whether outsourcing is successful concerns the individuals performing 
the work. A more complete model would include organizational, environmental, 
and individual employee characteristics that all work in concert to determine the 
appropriate situation in which to outsource. 
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